THUA TICH — the battle that embarrassed the Australian Army
It is a travesty that an obscure Australian infantry platoon that fought in the Vietnam War with astonishing success at Thua Tich — the 2nd D&E Platoon — does not yet ‘officially’ exist in Australian Army records, or in any history of the conflict.
It was one of the most lethal Australian units to operate in the war, and is credited with killing and wounding a very large number of the enemy in a very short time, and did so without having a single casualty of its own. This was due to the exceptional leadership of the platoon by Corporal James Riddle — a remarkable English ex-marine commando, who had assumed the leadership of the platoon by default.
That a record of this platoon has never been recorded to date is a disgrace; that the men who fought in it have been denied their valid place in military history, is a national embarrassment.
In fact, if it wasn’t for a series of photographs that were taken by two photographers embedded in the platoon (Army Sgt Bellis, and civilian photographer Dennis Gibbons) there would be no record of its activities at all.
The trouble is, it was those very photographers, snap, snapping away that resulted in the platoon’s deletion from all records of the war.
I refer to a ready-reactionary force of approximately 40 infantrymen which operated for six weeks during 1969 — from about May 12th, until end of June, that year. It was made up of regular soldiers left behind when the 4th Battalion (4 RAR) went home at the end of its tour — men who had reinforced the battalion during its tour of duty, and who had yet to complete the minimum six months ‘in country’.
I am proud to say that I was one of the men who fought in the 2nd D&E Platoon, and this narrative is designed to place the platoon into its correct place in military history.
FORMATION
In 1969, when the 4th Battalion was due to complete its tour, 40 Regular soldiers who had reinforced that battalion, and who had not yet completed the minimum six month’s service expected of regular soldiers, were marched out of the 4th Battalion’s lines and transferred to new tents in HQ Company near the boozer in 1ATF.
There were no bunks, and no bedding, and the soldiers made do with whatever we could find.
There, next day, lined up on parade, we were informed by Major George Pratt (the OC of HQ Company) that we were now the ‘2nd D&E Platoon’. This was neither here nor there for most of us. As infantry privates, we were unaware that any such entity as a ‘first D&E Platoon’ even existed, and whether or not there were two of them was of no consequence to us.
In February 2007, at the height of the controversy swirling around the validity of this platoon (many veterans vilifying us for saying it did) Major Pratt confirmed the existence of the ‘2nd D&E Platoon’ in writing:
This was confirmed by the first officer to lead the platoon — Barry Parkin (later a Major) in an email to this author:
THE ROLL-CALL
From the Routine Orders of the day, I can confirm that the men confirmed to have fought in this platoon are:
R.H. Appleby; R.C. Ellis; G.W. Beh; D.N. Manski; C.J. Fahey; O.W. Schuler; D.W. Tate; H.G. Browning; R.J. Enright; K.G. Lloyd-Thomas; R.J. Rickert; E.W. Colmer; D.R. Moss; R.A. Bigwood; C.R. Ebsworth; R.J. Cairns; B.J. Cannons; A. Seychell; I.R. Ramadge; J.B. Riddle; L. Ellcombe; B. Rennie; D.J. McGregor; R.F. Bryant; J.C. Fleer; R.B. Howie; G.C. Williams; T.J. Slattery; W.H. Whitney; S.F. Patterson; D.J. Blazely; P.D. Allen; R.S. Secrett; J.L. Arnold; R.S. Belgrove; A.J. Roach; M.P. McAuley; D.H. Simpson; M.L. Bann; P.S. Morgan; P.R. Brown
Note: When this platoon was disbanded, some of these men were then assimilated into the other, generic D&E Platoon — further confusing the issue.
RATIONALE FOR THIS PLATOON’S CREATION
There is evidence that insurgent SAS patrols had reported large numbers of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops on the move in AO’s Frog and Scorpion (including Thua Tich and Xuyen Moc) in early May, 1969. In fact, the official 3 SAS Squadron Narrative, Duty Officer’s Log, Annexes May 1969 record 35 sightings of enemy, both Viet Cong and NVA, totaling almost 1000 enemy soldiers.
According to the Field Commander’s Diary (dated May 12th, 1969) Brigadier ‘Sandy’ Pearson decided to create a second D&E Platoon to counter this activity. He opted to use the reinforcements from the 4th Battalion, but chose only the regular soldiers for this special platoon and not the national servicemen who had also reinforced the battalion.
Brigadier Pearson — the Task Force Commander — refused to use the SAS force to tackle this large build-up of Viet Cong.
When this fact was made public, it caused an uproar. The assertion was that we were attacking the fighting ability of SAS. We weren’t. But two documents from other sources do suggest it. The first was a letter to the AWM by a former senior army officer (Owen Eather) who was a confidante of Brigadier Pearson:
And the second was confirmation by no lesser an authority than the national historian — Ashley Ekins — that Pearson did not trust SAS. This extract is from ‘Fighting to the Finish’ — Ekins’ final volume on the Vietnam War:
This suggests that Brigadier Pearson made a deliberate decision about the make-up of this platoon, with one eye on the professionalism of regular infantry soldiers, and one eye on political expediency.
Major Barry Parkin provided a further explanation for the 2nd D&E Platoon’s deletion from the war records when he wrote:
‘…it has been a matter of concern to many (including myself) as to why the existence of the 2nd D&E Platoon was never acknowledged, and our service with that unit never recorded. Major George Pratt asked HQ 1ATF what he should do with all the spare soldiers (left behind by 4RAR) and it was then decided to raise a 2nd D&E Platoon to work with the APC squadron as a ready-reactionary force.’
The platoon operated in conjunction with, and under under the authority of the Armoured Corps, but was never formalised on the Task Force structure (ORBAT). It was this singular act of administrative negligence that had the greater consequence for the men involved.
TRAINING
Initial training for this platoon involved “watermanship” training on mangrove swamps near Baria.This involved patrolling on flat-bottomed aluminium craft. Sgt John Chainey was seconded from 4RAR to assist with the platoon’s formation and initial training. He was never part of this platoon, and only lasted a couple of days before returning home with the battalion.
First-hand recollections from this initial activity include comments by Cpl James Riddle: “I do recall that bit of water training on the Delta… That’s where I recall Steve Patterson trying to do a deal with the local ARVN. I asked him to organise something illegal ‘cos he was a sort of ‘fixer and collector’….and from the platoon’s initial commander, Lt Barry Parkin: “I remember doing watermanship training down near Baria in assault boats, and during that time we decided to go fishing using hand grenades. Those underwater explosions caused us to have a visit from a US Navy swift boat, stationed nearby…”
We never got to use those ‘watermanship’ skills. We were all glad of that.
Then, we were told we would be doing things differently than we were used to in the 4th Battalion. Instead of barging through the bush like every other infantryman, we’d be riding in, and on, armoured personnel carriers (APCs). We thought that sounded like a great idea.
In the first week or so, we learned new tactics, like how to quietly roll out the backs of APC’s as they moved through the jungle, and how to operate with the armour in ambush situations.
OTHER UNITS INVOLVED
Although this was, in essence, a combined armour/infantry force under the command of Capt Tom Arrowsmith — 2 Troop, B Squadron, 3 CAV Regiment, it also contained other elements. There was also a Mortar Platoon from 5RAR (see pictures below, and the information) and a couple of Engineers.
One of the 5RAR Mortar Platoon veterans involved (pictured earlier) has stated publicly:
Hi Don,
My name is Don Greentree, I was on the mortar tube at the battle of Thua Tich , 29 May 1969. Like you I have been battling all these years to have the members of that 5th Battalion mortar crew recognised.
There is no mention in our battalion records of us ever being there or even that the battle took place. I am the one on the cover of Frank Walkers book, ‘ Ghost Platoon ‘, back towards the camera sitting behind the 50. Cal.
I am about to write to our association again for a final attempt to have our mortar crew recognised.
My time is running out to keep fighting for this. I am now in a nursing home with end stage Parkinson’s, 3 strokes and cancer and I feel I am not going to win this fight. I do believe there are only 2 , maybe 3, of the crew left now and it is so wrong that our own battalion will not recognise our participation in that battle.
LEADERSHIP
Although Capt Tom Arrowsmith of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps had overall authority for the operations of the combined armour/infantry force, Lt Barry Parkin was our initial platoon commander. He only lasted a week or so, before being given other duties, and was not seen again for a month or so — until after the ambush at Thua Tich.
When Parkin left, Cpl Jim Riddle assumed leadership of the platoon, and remained so for the duration of the platoon’s life. Riddle was a former ex-marine from the British commandos, and was well respected by every man in this platoon.
Capt Arrowsmith, like Jim Riddle, was well respected by us infantrymen. He had a real military presence about him, as Riddle commented, “I was most impressed by Captain Arrowsmith. He was at war with the enemy only, not with his troops or his home life, or office life. He was focussed on the now period, knew what was happening about him, and was flexible in his ability to adapt for ground, weather and any circumstances. He gave a feeling of being seriously capable. He was a rarity.”
GENERAL ACTIVITIES
In the first week of operation, we were not all that successful. The platoon laid down a number of ambushes, and had various small contacts with the enemy but recorded no kills.
Major Parkin writes about one incident: …. ‘… I recall our D&E Platoon came across two VC wheeling a 500 pound bomb down the road, and the resulting firefight.’
And section-commander, Cpl Denis Manski recalled:
‘Just before the Thua Thich ambush, eight of us, led by Jim Riddle, exited an APC by the back ramp, lowered as the vehicle kept moving. We ambushed a track, and put claymores out. A very fierce tropical storm hit us in the night, and during it, we heard enemy soldiers coming down the track, calling out as if they didn’t have a care in the world. Ted Colmer (the gunner) opened up, but the rain and sand splashed up into his M60, and it jammed. We fired off the claymores, and Jim called in mortars “danger close” because of the large number of enemy in front of us. The enemy did not engage us, and all we recovered was a tobacco pouch — which annoyed the cavalry boys, no end.’
THE AMBUSH AT THUA TICH
This all changed on may 29th 1969.
On that night, this force ambushed a very large force of enemy soldiers at the gates to Thua Tich. The size of the enemy force varies between 50+ and 800, depending on which source one takes note of. The cavalry narrative (written the day after, and them seeing only the first part of the enemy unit) records it as “50+”, while the infantrymen (who were the closest to the main body and a kilometre further down the track, being parallel to the road the enemy were on) estimate the number at 500–800. The cavalry conducted their part in the ambush from the relative safety of APC’s supported by a section of infantrymen, while the section of infantry section at the listening post was involved at close quarters from the jungle floor.
The ambush is recorded in the Armoured Corps Narratives:
And Captain Tom Arrowsmith gave this interview to an ABC journalist a day later:
https://www.facebook.com/1638701263085542/videos/1703557116599956/
THE BATTLE UNFOLDS
Thua Tich was no more than grass-covered mounds of debris, the village having been destroyed many years previous in another conflict. The dirt roads leading into it had been raised and compacted, and the trees and undergrowth removed on both sides — creating a clear fire lane for the armoured carriers.
Arrowsmith and Riddle conferred, and decided to lay an ambush down near the forlorn-looking gates of the village. Arrowsmith used two of his six APC’s in this location, and the others set down ambushes within a five kilometre radius. One of Arrowsmith’s carriers was capable of firing a mortarfrom inside — a novel idea in itself. He was supported by two sections of the infantry, while Riddle took the remaining infantry section some 400 metres or so, south of Arrowsmith’s position, just below a knoll of higher ground
At about 2030 hours, Riddle’s section of enemy at the listening post spotted three enemy brazenly walking towards them. He alerted Arrowsmith by radio, then within minutes, told Arrowsmith to let them pass by his position. He’d deduced that they were only decoys, on account of they were talking relatively loudly, and were wearing white shirts.
He was right. When they had passed, minutes later, a very large force of heavily-armed enemy force of North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong began to pass in front of the infantry position. Riddle jumped on the radio to Arrowsmith to alert him about the decoys.
A minute or two later, even as the bulk of the enemy unit was still moving past Riddle’s position, Arrowsmith’s .50 cal machine-guns opened up on the leading elements of the larger element of the force. All hell broke loose.
Suddenly, Riddle’s small infantry group found itself in a bind. The enemy was forming up along the crest of a ridge, directly in front of them, on the other side of the road. It was obvious they were organising themselves to launch a counter-attack against the APC’s, and given their number, would certainly have been successful.
Riddle had to make a decision — either stay quiet and let the armoured corps carriers do their best, or open fire on the enemy at close range, thereby creating a diversion, and perhaps confusing the enemy as to who and what was engaging them. He never acted on impulse when it came to warfare, but realised he had no choice in the matter.
Although Riddle realized his small ground unit was vulnerable, his tactical skill in setting up his ambush position gave his small infantry section a number of advantages. Along with the claymores, he’d set up flares at both ends of the position, with mounds of sand behind them. This was to cast shadows on his own position when they were fired. It was a tactic he’d learned from an astute corporal in the 4th Battalion, and it worked perfectly. As well, each man was firmly dug in to foxholes, or had built barriers of logs as protection.
Riddle chose to open up on the enemy from his position.
He initiated the infantry part of the contact himself, lining up a line of M79 rounds, and firing them into the main body of the enemy force. The rest of his men followed his lead, and hooked in. The enemy returned concentrated fire into the infantry position with no effect. Riddle’s precise, tactical placement of each man, proved decisive.
Rocket-propelled grenades exploded harmlessly in front of the group’s position, though one lifted the M60 almost vertically off the ground at one point. The gunner wasn’t phased.
The contact lasted for a long time, without the enemy ever realising they outnumbered Riddle’s infantrymen many times over, and could easily have over-run his position. At one point, Dennis Manski screamed out to Riddle to get the carriers to stop shooting, fearing that the carrier’s bullets were also coming the way of the sentry group.
When the battle died down, but with the enemy moving all around his position, Riddle requested mortar fire support from Arrowsmith, but Arrowsmith was busy himself, using the mortar capability to hit possible enemy forming-up positions around his position. Eventually, some rounds of mortar were loosed off around the infantry group in a haphazard fashion that made Riddle see red.
Eventually, after an hour or so, ‘Spooky’ was called in, and flew circles around the position, loosing off thousands of rounds, while one of Riddle’s men lay on his back holding an army torch with a red filter to indicate his position.
‘…Spooky’ in action was a fearsome sight, like a locomotive loosed in the jungle. Cpl Riddle recalls: “The ground in front of me seemed to suddenly grow into a forest of brown trees. As the torrent of bullets struck the dry earth, they threw up explosions of soil, each bullet kickedup a ‘bush’ of earth, and in the orange light of the hanging flares it looked to me, from very close tothe ground, that the world was exploding. The leaping ground seemed to run towards us in a wave of loud farting sounds. Suddenly I noticed a line of my men, including ‘Ernie’ Entwhistle (?) a fellowEnglishman, Privates Don Tate and ‘Snow’ Manski, closely followed by two others from the machine gun crew rushing backwards, away from ‘Spooky’s’ fire. We felt this tremendous blast of gunfire tearup the ground about three feet across our front, and then it was past and we all crawled back. I think we all pretended that this had been a sort of organised and planned withdrawal, but it was more of a knee jerk panic. We got back into our holes, while I got onto the radio to let ‘Spooky’ know that wewere satisfied with his first straffing run, and it would be OK to switch to further away from our frontnow, and ‘thank you’! There’s little doubt now that there were no living enemy soldiers close to our front.”
(NOTE: Riddle was incorrect in placing this author at the listening post.)
Spooky’ was called back for a second attack about midnight. This section of infantry inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. According to Cpl Dennis Manski:
‘We could hear them screaming out and groaning around us all night. We could see them dragging away their killed and wounded in themoonlight, some screaming, some groaning.’
(An account of this ambush is also recorded in ‘When The Scorpion Stings’ by Paul Anderson. It is written from the cavalry perspective.)
Army photographer, Sgt. Bellis, arrived next morning along with Dennis Gibbons, and significant senior army officers believed to be: Brigadier C. Pearson (the C.O. of the Australian Task Force); Major David Chinn; Major Ron Rooks (C.O. of the Armoured Corps) and an American officer.
Many photographs were taken, and are currently in the Australian War Memorial collection. The infantrymen shown in these photographs are referred to as ‘D&E Platoon’, but that is incorrect.
The generic D&E Platoon was 30 kilometrs away.
It was the 2nd D&E Platoon that was involved in the ambush.
THE CONTENTIONS
The successful ambush was reported widely in Australian newspapers:
After the ambush, 11 VC bodies were found, with many drag marks. Riddle began a search of the bodies. He writes, “So I just got on with the first body. We worked in pairs; one searched a body while his buddy watched for movement, close and far. I had deliberately selected one bloke to be my backup. He was a short man, with almost white hair, called, not surprisingly, ‘Snow’ Manski. He had not seen a dead body before, so now I felt he could get initiated, and at the same time I could sort of walk him quietly through the present situation, this bloody awful experience with someone who was calm and unimpressed. The other soldiers in my outfit had all seen dead bodies, some enemy and some who had been their pals. Private Don Tate and one other who had been with the 4th Battalion had been through a short hell some time before, and they were now unimpressed by the sight, except by the particular level of this night of carnage. I think they also realised it wasn’t finished yet. We were doing okay until our third body. This was the man I had shot first as he stumbled off the road towards our flares. He lay on his back, his eyes open. His pale brown face was blue at the lips and forehead, and the sense of death was obvious in his close likeness to a doll or scruffy tailor’s dummy. I could not see any wound or blood. Our special interest in all bodies was to see what they carried in their packs, and as he was on his back, his pack was lodged firmly under him, keeping him sort of arched. I cut the straps of his pack, releasing it from his backward grasp, and grabbing his arm I flipped him away to one side. As his small body rolled onto its front, there started a loud glugging, squelching sound that startled meand ‘Snow’ into jumping back and swinging our rifles up. We stood, shocked as the soldier’s body shivered and literally emptied a wave of blood from his throat out onto a shallow dip beneath him. It sounded just like an upturned water bottle emptying its contents quickly. I felt sorry for ‘Snow’- this was heavy for a first timer. I will be surprised if he ever forgets that moment.”
VIET CONG REVENGE
The next day, May 30th, the troop of APC’s carrying this platoon towards the village of Xuyen Moc was ambushed by remnants of the force it had ambushed the night before. Riddle writes, ‘We also went on from that ambush, to being ambushed ourselves on the way back. I warned all Indians (infantry) to be prepared for an ambush soon. A spotter in a Sioux chopper warned us, and we killed a few more.’
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES
After the ambush at Thua Tich, some of the bodies of the dead enemy were disposed of in a manner I had never seen before — tossed into a bomb crater, wired up with explosives, and blown up. This was called an “engineer’s burial”. Other bodies, including a female, were strapped to APC’s by toggle ropes behind Capt Arrowsmith’s APC, and some were dragged into the village of Xuyen Moc as propaganda. That action had been approved by the Australian Army. And, en route to Xuyen Moc, machine-gunners opened up on innocent villagers.
I referred to these matters, or alluded to them, in my memoir, The War Within (Murdoch Books, 2008):
‘…Afterwards, when Pearson and his hangers-on had gone, they got us infantry boys to drag most of the bodies into a bombcrater. There was going to be a ‘sapper’s burial’, as they called it. We all cheered that. Especially the cavalry boys — they didn’t want to load the bloodied carcasses into their APC’s. Fair enough too, we thought. Who’d want to ride in there after they’d been carting around bodies as mutilated as some ofthem were. ‘Spooky’ tended to do that……There was another incident too, that day, on the road to Xuyen Moc when some of the boys were ‘out of their lids’, as Riddle described it. But I’ll let it lie. Some dogs shouldn’t be disturbed…”
These photographs from the AWMs collection show bodies being dragged to the bomb crater (it may have just been a very large hole) and the looks on the faces of the villagers of Xuyen Moc watching other bodies being dragged into their village behind Arrowmith’s APC:
For decades, the Australian War Memorial refused to admit that atrocities occurred at Thua Tich. Their opinion, unsubstantiated, was that all the biodies had been neatyly disposed of wrapped in green tarpaukins. It was deliberate obfuscation.
Normie Rowe (the reluctant conscript to Vietnam) once foolishly called for a Royal Commission into the allegations about his beloved Armoured Corps.
The idea was shot down very quickly.
But, on his death bed, former cavalryman, Trooper Allan Stanton (the driver of Capt Tom Arrowsmith’s APC) wrote in his memoir, Before I Forget (Sid Harta Press):
‘The ‘Arrow’ (Capt Tom Arrowsmith), like me, did not want the bodies in the cargo area of our carrier, so it was decided to take five bodies, tie them together and hang them by their ankles from the back of the carrier for the trip back to Xuyen Moc. ……. “Before leaving the ambush site we had one further task to perform- dispose of the other six bodies. We dragged them to an old bomb crater just to the side of the old gates of the deserted village. Along with the bodies were placed explosives, hand grenades, a number of Claymore mines, a few gallons of petrol and a long fuse cord. The fuse was lit and about five minutes later the explosion of our crude burial could be heard…….. (After the second VC attack on the way to Xuyen Moc)… “There was now one more task to perform before our return to the Dat- take the bodies of the five VC still hanging from the back of Two-Alpha-Zero (Stanton ‘s APC) into the village square. I knew they were still there by the shocked looks on the faces of the locals as we drove through the village…… The bodies were cut from the carrier and left with the village chief to do what he wanted with them.’
As well, Cpl Jim Riddle wrote, ‘That was when we dragged the bodies behind us. Yes, the lads came and asked me what I thought about that, and I told them I was pissed off, but it was the thing soldiers do who are in their first combat and who are 'out of their lids’. I'd seen it before, and felt bad, but war is not for humans, so for a while, we were not human. I later got a lecture about teaching my blokes to be killers, and that they would some day have to be re-indoctrinated into society. I agreed with the view, but also pointed out that if they followed my teaching, they were very likely to return alive and whole, to be re-indoctrinated.’ and elaborated further when he wrote, “I recall the girl who was killed at the ambush, and there was another on the way back, after the ambush, when the tracks were in a panic and heading at speed while firing at people in the fields, on the way to Xuyen Moc the following morning. It wasn'ta deliberate killing. It was pure and simple panic by ‘trackies’ who had just been ambushed and were shit scared. We tried to stop them shooting, but we were all standing up in the back of the tracks and couldn't get at the gunners in time. These gunners were the untried ones. They joined us after the night ambush…’
Pte Edward Colmer (another 2nd D&E Platoon member) wrote, ‘....the villagers hated us for brassing them up en route to Xuyen Moc, from the Thua Tich engagements…’
‘Atrocities’ or ‘war crimes’?
In 1976, Pte R. Enright (a 2nd D&E Platoon member) had gone to the major Northern Territory news paper with allegations of ‘atrocities’ having been committed at Thua Tich. An enquiry by a Major Gordon Pound found no substance to the allegations — but he never sought evidence from any of the men involved.
His report (called the Major Pound Report and which was the ‘official’ report of the investigation he carried out) was subsequently ‘lost’ within Defence records for decades until investigative journalist Frank Walker found it in the National Archives in 2011.
It had sat on the desk of a senior army officer of the 6th Battalion (Butler) and in the Army History Unit for over a decade, in full view of and knowledge of, senior officers of the ADF— even as the debate raged about its existence, or not.
In 2009, given the circumstances behind the ‘editing-out’ of all trace of the 2nd D&E Platoon from the histories of the war (at least until 2008) I referred all the matters concerning this platoon to the Australian Federal Police for investigation.
What convinced me to do so, along with the absolute refusal of the Australian War Memorial to validate the 2nd D&E Platoon’s existence, were the comments by Edward Colmer, a former member of the platoon (and an ex-federal police officer, and ASIS-trained in covert operations etc etc) who put the legal aspects down quite clearly:
‘My research has revealed their contravention (Thua Tich & elsewhere) under Part: 1, Article 3 - Fourth Geneva Convention (or GCIV) with Article 3, stating with reference to combatants who are 'hors de combat' (out of the fight) due to their death from the ambush, with (a) & (c) inter alia, relating to mutilation, and degrading treatment, irrespective of whether they are dead or alive! The Australian Military (Cth) Law at the time would have also considered this treatment prohibitive, and subject to Court Marshal. There is no statute of limitations with such seriousbreaches!’
Colmer stated that he was prepared to “touch on the atrocities” unless Ashley Ekins, historian of theAWM validated the platoon’s existence, and that he was prepared to file a “Brief of Evidence” himself to the AFP in respect of the matters.
It didn’t come to that.
The AFP subsuequently acknowl.ledged that ‘atrocities;’ had occurred, albeit that they were at the ‘low end of the atrocity scale’. (Who knew there was such a scale?)
THE 2ND D&E PLATOON WAS DISBANDED AND EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORD BOOKS
After those ‘contentions’ of the 30th May 1969, Captain Arrowsmith’s Troop was immediately replaced by that of Capt David Lawrence. Arrowsmith was demoted.
None of the infanrymen had any regard for Lawrence, nor he for us. According to Cpl Jim Riddle, Lawrence regarded the infantry component as ‘…ill-mannered animals led by a disgusting, foul-mouthed mercenary...” and informed Major George Pratt of his opinion.
There were a number of incidents that created animosity between the troopers and the infantry, not the least of which was the troopers throwing our backpacks out onto the ground during a storm, and us having to rescue them from a swollen creek.
The arrival of Lawrence signaled the end of a very profitable association between armour and infantry.
About the middle of June, 1969, most of the members of the 2nd D&E Platoon were posted to new battalions — mostly to the 9th Battalion to augment a battalion that had a high percentage of national servicemen. A few remained behind to reinforce the generic D&E Platoon, under the command of Lt Ray Woolan.
At the end of June, the remnants of the 2nd D&E Platoon were disbanded, without fanfare or explanation — despite its very successful stint.
There are various theories as to why the 2nd D&E Platoon was disbanded:
- that the manner in which the bodies were disposed of after Thua Thich, and the other contentions that occurred were a matter of some concern to senior command
- that the ill-feeling between the tankies and we infantrymen (an animosity fostered by a new Armoured Corps officer, Captain Lawrence) was boiling over
- that the relative success of this mobile force was embarrassing to the hierarchy, insofar as its operations proved far more successful than any other single infantry platoon engaged in bush-barging
Nevertheless, word of the atrocities made its way to Australia. Journalist Derryn Hinch referred to it in his article in October 1987 (3rd column):
However, since the 2nd D@E Platoon never “officially” existed, no one can provide an ‘official’ explanation as to why the platoon was very quickly removed from all records of the war — and thereby corrupting the service records of those who served in it.
Afterwards…
- Captain Tom Arrowsmith received an upgrade of his initial MID — to a Medal of Gallantry in the End- of-War List (once the dust had settled)
- And Lt Ray Woolan (platoon commander of the other D&E Platoon) received a Military Cross for gallantry. According to Ted Colmer this was a concocted citation, ‘....read Woolan's concocted Citation, and go to all the war diary references??? and note the incongruous embellishment of the Citation [with reference to Courtenay Rubber] Given that I still think Woolan was a great bloke and good "Skipper", and made reference to a group of us in the HQ Coy 1 ATF Bar about why he couldn't understand being awarded an MC, I believe he knew exactly what transpired, between commissioned officers, and just told us what we wanted to hear!’
- In 2008 (ironically, on the 29th May) after representations to the Hon Jennie George MP, the Hon Dr Mike Kelly MP formally recognised the existence of the 2nd D&E Platoon and declared that it would be ‘forever enshrined in the histories of the war.’
It was a battle that had taken 38 years to win.
I trust that the 2nd D&E Platoon can now take its place in history as a legitimate entity in the war record, and those of us who fought in it, can rightfully lay claim to having been part of a unique military “experiment”.
THE FINAL WORD
There are a number of books now available substantiating the existence of the 2nd D&E Platoon.
In 2011, journalist Frank Walker began a year-long investigation into the deletion of the 2nd D&E Platoon from all records of the war. He concluded that the platoon had, indeed, existed, and wrote, Ghost Platoon (Hachette) in which he concluded that Defence had done all it could to suppress the facts about the 2nd D&E Platoon and the contentions that occurred at Thua Tich and Xuyen Moc on May 30th 1969.
Walker later wrote: ’…I was a journalist on The Sun-Herald seven years ago when I first heard stories of Vietnam veterans from a unit called the 2nd D&E Platoon and their extraordinary struggle to get recognition that they had existed despite denials from officers of Defence and military historians at the Australian War Memorial.
In 2011, I researched the background to this story for 12 months through FOI, from documents at the Australian War Memorial and National Archives, and also from speaking to key people involved. Don Tate kindly gave me access to piles of documents and statements he had collected over several years as he led the campaign to get an admission that the platoon had existed for about six weeks in May/June 1969.
Even veterans who still suffered PTSD from the war told me their stories in the belief the truth of what happened should be revealed. It wasn’t easy for many of them as they still wrestle daily with their nightmares. But they were battling a military bureaucracy and a clique of veterans that were determined to have the story of what the platoon was involved in buried and forgotten.
I managed to find files that were hidden away in the archives that proved what the men were saying was true.
But military historians on the public payroll at the Australian War Memorial seemed determined to bury the story. Ashley Ekins, the AWM’s resident official historian for the Vietnam War, refused to speak to me. I repeatedly sent him questions and asked for an interview but he refused. Ekins had formed the opinion that the 2nd D&E Platoon never existed, and would not budge from that opinion…I think the story of the 2nd D&E platoon reveals the extent to which the military bureaucracy seeks to cover up and bury anything that doesn’t go along with the glossy myth they perpetuate of the bronzed larrikin Anzac who happily goes to war and comes back just as happy…’
I also wrote a detailed analysis for the Australian War Memorial’s Collection:
FOOTNOTES:
The 2nd D&E Platoon matter caused great divisions within the Vietnam veteran community.
The Australian War Memorial steadfastly refuses to accept that the 2nd D&E Platoon ever existed, even to this day. In fact, in 2011, the national historian — Ashley Ekins — went so far as to deny its existence before a Senate Standing Petition:
There was a lot of jealousy and envy within the veteran community surrounding the publishing of my memoir — The War Within — in which I outlined the matter. But the greater division was caused by in-fighting of former members of the platoon.
Chief among these was Edward Colmer who declared that I wasn’t at Thua Tich (even though it had been me who had first described the activities and actions of the platoon in my memoir when no records existed of the platoon.)
This caused me great harm, as it was meant to do, and brought much vitriol my way.
But Colmer’s deceit was soon apparent when an email he sent to many veterans on the 15th June 2009 concerning aspects of the 2nd D&E Platoon, stated:
‘…Platoon Commander: 2nd Lt Barry Parkin — (detached “Y” from 1 ARU as Infantry Platoon Commander HQ 1 ATF until 19 June 69 — returned to posted duty 1 ARU). Unfortunately Barry had a dual administrative role with 4 RAR’s Final Departure 28 May 69, requiring James “Jim” Bertram Riddle to assume temporary command, and yes Jim Riddle, Barney Bigwood; Kevin Lloyd-Thomas; Don Tate, and all others including Peter “Pedro” Allen were involved in the engagements at Thua Tich and elsewhere, and yes the infantry platoon consisted of 40 ARA REO Riflemen from 4 RAR, with a designated infantry commissioned platoon commander and subordinate command structure, albeit, under the op con of 2 Troop 3 Cav [Captain Tom Arrowsmith MID MG 14 May — 30 May 69] and 1 Troop 3 Cav [Captain David Lawrence 31 May — 8 June 69] During the course of our deployment on Phase: 2 Operation Garryowen from date: 14 May 69–8 June 69 we operated with a designated call sign I — 63 [India — 63] and conducted combined RIF operations with these troops, that also included successful section size ambush posts. All men including: Cav troopers; Infantry; Sappers; and Mortar men [4, 9 RAR & 5 RAR- Thua Tich] always fought with courage and some real aggressive gallantry, and any trivial rivalry was just that.
A further letter of validation came from a fellow member of the platoon — Robert Enright — was also made public in a personal letter to me:
..” you wouldn’t remember me I’m sure because we never spoke ,, but the few I knew I have never forgotten i.e Riddle, Manski, Bann, Ellis, Grant, Whitney, Slattery, especially Slatts, I smoked my first joint in his company and laughed for hours,,, I’ve been reading the posts on the avm site,, it’s a full on shouting match,, and you are carrying a bucket of water to toss at hell on earth but one has to ask why such a vitriolic reaction… why indeed… after all we were considered no more than a few dumb grunts without a future… and those bodies they desecrated ?? I mean so what now,,, even though years ago I became obsessed with the memory the dead don’t care and the power to be even less…”, ..and of course you were there at thua tich ,, I can’t see how any one could deny that, there must have been at least a dozen guys who knew you , for myself I well knew because I rode on the same track as you and as a negative is more impressionable there is no doubt ,, that is before leaving 4 rar I went to Thailand on R&R and on return joined D&E, the point is I was obsessed with the m60 machine gun and had to have it where ever I went ,, I guess it was an extension of my penis !!! anyway when I climbed that track and found an M60 barrel albeit unloaded pointing at me I not only wanted to punch you out for being a dickhead but I was convinced nobody except myself could shoot one better than me, and you should hand it over…”
Later, Colmer also admitted that I had been there, as well.
But the damage was done — and Colmer had to live with it, as well as admitting that he had mental issues.
Perhaps this statement by a fellow veteran of the 2nd D&E Platoon in support of me says it all:
I am Kevin Lloyd-Thomas. When I left the Army in March, 1972, I was 216853 Cpl. Kevin Lloyd-Thomas.
The 2nd D&E Platoon did exist, and it has been officially recognised by the government of this country.
I was a Section Commander in that platoon, and Don Tate was the machine gunner in my section.
I can assure you that Don Tate was as good a machine gunner, and as good a soldier as any of the other men I served with during my two tours of Vietnam between May, 1967, and November, 1969.
As far as I am concerned, and based on my experience in working with him in D Company, 4 RAR, and then as the machine gunner in my section in the 2nd D&E Platoon, Don’s capability as a soldier, and in combat on several occasions, can withstand any scrutiny.
There are many others who would say the same.
